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ADMINISTERING THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION
POST-HOSANNA-TABOR: WHY CONTRACT CLAIMS
SHOULD NOT BE BARRED†
KEVIN J. MURPHY*
INTRODUCTION
In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, the
Supreme Court was presented with the question whether the First
Amendment barred an Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) claim
against a religious organization by one of the organization’s ministers.1
The Court unanimously held that both the Free Exercise Clause and
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment bar employment dis-
crimination claims by a minister against his employer, thereby affirming
the existence of the ministerial exception.2  The Court explained:
Requiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted minister, or
punishing a church for failing to do so, intrudes upon more than
a mere employment decision.  Such action interferes with the
internal governance of the church, depriving the church of con-
trol over the selection of those who will personify its beliefs.3
At the end of Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the Court, he
expressly limited the scope of the Court’s holding:
The case before us is an employment discrimination suit . . . .
We express no view on whether the exception bars other types of
suits, including actions by employees alleging breach of contract
or tortious conduct by their religious employers.  There will be
time enough to address the applicability of the exception to other
circumstances if and when they arise.4
Since the Court first placed its imprimatur on the ministerial
exception in Hosanna-Tabor, the question of the applicability of the
ministerial exception to tort and contract claims has begun to arise.
This Note will focus exclusively on the applicability of the ministerial
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Competition.
* J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2014; B.S. in Accounting and Finance,
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1. 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
2. Id.
3. Id.
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exception to contract claims.5  These contract claims may be premised
on express contracts or implied through informal sources, such as an
employee handbook;6 this Note simply refers to both as contracts.
Courts before and after Hosanna-Tabor have addressed the ministe-
rial exception’s applicability to a minister’s claim that he was termi-
nated in violation of his contract.  The ministerial exception does not
apply to a minister’s contract claims against his employer outside the
context of termination;7 in fact, multiple cases since Hosanna-Tabor
have held that contract claims by a minister against his employer for
backpay can progress without even citing Hosanna-Tabor.8  The crux of
the issue is whether a minister’s claim that he was terminated in violation
of his contract is barred by the ministerial exception.  Claims of this
nature may arise even more often than the antidiscrimination claims of
Hosanna-Tabor.9  Courts addressing this issue post-Hosanna-Tabor have
found that the ministerial exception bars these wrongful termination
contract claims because adjudicating these disputes interferes with a
religious organization’s exclusive ability to control who teaches and
spreads its faith.10
Currently pending before the Kentucky Supreme Court11 are two
cases that squarely address the question of the ministerial exception’s
applicability to wrongful termination contract claims.12  One of these
cases, Kant v. Lexington Theological Seminary, has garnered widespread
5. Courts post-Hosanna-Tabor have also addressed the issue of the ministerial excep-
tion’s applicability to a minister’s tort claims. See, e.g., Erdman v. Chapel Hill Presbyterian
Church, 286 P.3d 357, 364 (Wash. 2012) (dismissing negligent retention and negligent
supervision claims under the ministerial exception based on their potential to “implicate
a religious organization’s First Amendment right to select its clergy”).
6. See David J. Overstreet, Does the Bible Preempt Contract Law?: A Critical Examination
of Judicial Reluctance to Adjudicate a Cleric’s Breach of Employment Contract Claim Against a
Religious Organization, 81 MINN. L. REV. 263, 277–78 (1996).  Overstreet analyzes many of
the same issues as this Note, emphasizing the importance of the voluntariness of contrac-
tual obligations.  This Note’s analysis differs from Overstreet’s in several ways: (1) this
Note analyzes the more recent doctrinal development of the ministerial exception,
including Hosanna-Tabor and its progeny; (2) it analyzes the historical ability of ministers
to sue religious organizations; (3) it considers the implications for religious organizations
of applying the ministerial exception to bar wrongful termination claims; and (4) it ana-
lyzes the issue in terms of mutuality of obligation.
7. See Klouda v. Sw. Baptist Theological Seminary, 543 F. Supp. 2d 594, 611 (N.D.
Tex. 2008) (describing the relationship between the ministerial exception and the
broader ecclesiastical abstention doctrine).
8. See, e.g., Second Episcopal Dist. African Methodist Episcopal Church v. Prioleau,
49 A.3d 812 (D.C. 2012); Crymes v. Grace Hope Presbyterian Church, Inc., No.
2011–CA–000746–MR, 2012 WL 3236290 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2012).
9. See Mark E. Chopko & Marissa Parker, 10 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 233, 294 (2012)
(“An examination of the actual claims to which the ministerial exception applies yields
many more examples of tort and contract claims than statutory anti-discrimination
claims.”).
10. See, e.g., DeBruin v. St. Patrick Congregation, 816 N.W.2d 878, 889 (Wis. 2012).
11. The cases discussed are pending before the Supreme Court of Kentucky as of
April 8, 2014.
12. See Kant v. Lexington Theological Seminary, No. 2011–CA–000004–MR, 2012
WL 3046472 (Ky. Ct. App. July 27, 2012) (noting that discretionary review was granted by
the Supreme Court of Kentucky); Kirby v. Lexington Theological Seminary, No.
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national attention.13 Kant deals with breach of contract claims by Lau-
rence Kant, previously a tenured faculty member at Lexington Theolog-
ical Seminary (LTS).14  Mr. Kant’s employment relationship with the
seminary was governed by the Faculty Handbook, which provided that
“[t]he only grounds for dismissal of a tenured faculty member are
moral delinquency, unambiguous failure to perform the responsibilities
outlined in this Handbook, or conduct detrimental to the Seminary.”15
In 2009, LTS encountered financial difficulties as a result of the
nation’s economic downturn and decided to terminate Mr. Kant’s
employment.16  Shortly thereafter, Mr. Kant filed suit alleging, inter alia,
breach of employment contract.  LTS moved to dismiss the case on the
grounds that it was barred by the ministerial exception and the circuit
court did so.17  In 2012, relying heavily on Hosanna-Tabor, the Kentucky
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.18  The court explained: “[I]t
does not matter that Kant has fashioned his case around a contract
cause of action; this does not trump the constitutional protections and
freedoms of the church.”19
The issue of whether the ministerial exception bars contract claims
like Mr. Kant’s presents a clash of values of fundamental importance.
On one hand, religious organizations must be free to decide who will
minister to the faithful.20  Imposing an unwanted minister upon a
church, or punishing the church for removing one, “depriv[es] the
church of control over the selection of those who will personify its
beliefs.”21  As the Fifth Circuit in McClure v. Salvation Army explained:
“The relationship between an organized church and its ministers is its
lifeblood.  The minister is the chief instrument by which the church
seeks to fulfill its purpose.”22  Given the Court’s clarity and unison in
13. See Amicus Curiae Brief of Alliance Defending Freedom and Association of
Christian Schools International on Behalf of Appellee Lexington Theological Seminary,
Kant v. Lexington Theological Seminary, No. 2011–CA–000004–MR (Ky. Apr. 29, 2013)
[hereinafter Alliance Defending Freedom Brief]; Brief of Amicus Curiae, Anti-Defama-
tion League, in Support of Appellant, Kant v. Lexington Theological Seminary, No.
2011–CA–000004–MR (Ky. Apr. 29, 2013); Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Associa-
tion of University Professors in Support of Dr. Laurence H. Kant, Kant v. Lexington Theo-
logical Seminary, No. 2011–CA–000004–MR (Ky. Apr. 26, 2013); Brief of Amicus Curiae
on Behalf of Appellant, Dr. Laurence H. Kant, Kant v. Lexington Theological Seminary,
No. 2011–CA–000004–MR (Ky. Apr. 23, 2013) [hereinafter Griffin Brief].  These briefs
are all available online at http://apps.courts.ky.gov/Supreme/CALENDAR/SCOAUG13.
pdf.
14. Kant v. Lexington Theological Seminary, No. 2011–CA–000004–MR, at *2 (Ky.
Ct. App. July 27, 2012), available at http://statecasefiles.justia.com/documents/ken-
tucky/court-of-appeals/2011-ca-000004-mr.pdf?ts=1343397799.
15. Id. at *5.
16. Id.
17. Id. at *7.
18. Id. at *24.
19. Id.
20. See Thomas C. Berg et al., Religious Freedom, Church-State Separation, and the Minis-
terial Exception, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 175, 176 (2011).
21. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694,
706 (2012).
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holding that a church must be free to select and remove its ministers in
Hosanna-Tabor, it would seem that the ministerial exception would like-
wise bar claims of termination in violation of an employment contract.
On the other hand, private contracts between a religious organiza-
tion and its ministers are voluntary obligations over which a church has
complete dominion.  Whereas the employment discrimination claims
barred by Hosanna-Tabor imposed public law obligations upon
churches, contracts are private agreements a church submits to of its
own volition.  A church can certainly enforce these obligations against
breaching ministers; why then should ministers be unable to avail them-
selves of these very same contractual words?  And if courts give no
meaning to these words, how would this impact the relationship
between a minister and a religious organization, a relationship largely
dependent on trust?  These concerns are magnified even further given
the Court’s flexible definition of a “minister” in Hosanna-Tabor.
This Note argues that the ministerial exception should not be
extended to bar wrongful termination contract claims for damages23 by
a minister against his employer.  Instead, courts should only dismiss
these claims under the broader ecclesiastical abstention doctrine when
interpreting the contractual provision would lead to excessive entangle-
ment in religious affairs.  Part I of this Note explains the Court’s deci-
sion in Hosanna-Tabor, with particular focus on the parts of the opinion
that are most relevant to the question whether the ministerial exception
should bar contract claims by a minister.  Part II discusses several cases
that address the application of the ministerial exception to breach of
contract claims by a minister both before and after Hosanna-Tabor.  This
Part concludes that since Hosanna-Tabor, courts appear more willing to
summarily dismiss ministers’ wrongful termination contract claims
under the ministerial exception without inquiring whether interpreting
the contract would require the court to enmesh itself in religious
doctrine.
Part III argues that the ministerial exception should not be applied
to ministers’ contract claims against their employers.  Part III concedes
that many of the same concerns that drove the result in Hosanna-Tabor
are present in wrongful termination suits, but argues there are persua-
sive reasons for not extending the ministerial exception to cover breach
of contract suits for damages.  Section III.A explains that, as a historical
matter, a minister’s contract claims against his employer were not
thought to be barred by the First Amendment.  Section III.B explains
that contract suits are distinguishable from employment discrimination
because they involve voluntary obligations a church freely assumes.
This Section argues that Free Exercise Clause concerns are ameliorated
in situations where a religious organization is held to its own self-
imposed standards, which are far different from the standards imposed
by the federal government through employment discrimination law.
23. This Note concedes that the ministerial exception must bar a minister’s con-
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Section III.C argues that an extension of the ministerial exception to
cover contract suits could have serious harmful consequences for the
minister-employer relationship and ultimately churches and religious
communities.
Finally, Section III.D explains that those wrongful termination con-
tract suits that truly involve interpretation of contracts that are religious
in substance, even if not categorically barred by the ministerial excep-
tion, would still be dismissed under the ecclesiastical abstention doc-
trine.  The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine bars adjudication of cases
when resolution would require courts to become excessively entangled
with religious doctrine.  Thus, this Section explains that the practical
implications of this Note’s argument are that courts will resolve minis-
ters’ wrongful termination claims against their employer when these
claims involve neutral principles of law.  This Section concludes that
the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine is sufficient to protect religious
liberty and strikes the proper balance between church autonomy and
contract law notions of mutuality of obligation.
I. HOSANNA-TABOR
Hosanna-Tabor involved a claim by Cheryl Perich, a former fourth-
grade teacher at a school run by Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church and School.24  Perich served as a “called” teacher at Hosanna-
Tabor (as opposed to a “lay” teacher), meaning she was “regarded as
having been called to [her] vocation by God through a congrega-
tion.”25  In addition to teaching classes like math, language arts, and
science, Perich led religion class four times a week, led the students in
daily prayer exercises, and attended chapel services once a week.26
In 2004, Perich became ill and was eventually diagnosed with nar-
colepsy.27  Perich was asked by the congregation’s leadership to resign,
but refused to do so, indicating that she intended to assert her legal
rights.28  She was thereby terminated for “insubordination and disrup-
tive behavior” and because her threat of legal action damaged her work-
ing relationship with the school.29  Perich filed a claim with the EEOC
that her employment had been terminated in violation of the retalia-
tory discharge provisions of the ADA.30  Hosanna-Tabor moved for
summary judgment, claiming that the suit was barred by the “ministe-
rial exception” rooted in the First Amendment.31  Though the district
court agreed that the suit was barred by the ministerial exception, the
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Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that Perich did not qualify as a “minister”
under the exception.32
A. The Ministerial Exception Is First Recognized by the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court began its discussion with a historical analysis,
explaining that “[c]ontroversy between church and state over religious
offices is hardly new.”33  The Court described how the First Amend-
ment was enacted against a backdrop of a nationalized church and
religious oppression in England.  “By forbidding the ‘establishment of
religion’ and guaranteeing the ‘free exercise thereof,’ the Religion
Clauses ensured that the new Federal Government—unlike the English
Crown—would have no role in filling ecclesiastical offices.”34
The Court turned next to its precedent, concluding that prior
cases “confirm that it is impermissible for the government to contradict
a church’s determination of who can act as its ministers.”35  The Court
discussed how its precedent stood for the proposition that the First
Amendment prevents courts from questioning ecclesiastical decisions
made by church authorities.36
Turning to the issue at hand, the Court observed that the circuits
had “uniformly recognized the existence of a ‘ministerial exception,’
grounded in the First Amendment” and that this exception precluded
employment discrimination claims by a minister of a religious organiza-
tion against his employer.37  The Court explained:
[M]embers of a religious group put their faith in the hands of
their ministers.  Requiring a church to accept or retain an
unwanted minister, or punishing a church for failing to do so,
intrudes upon more than a mere employment decision.  Such
action interferes with the internal governance of the church,
depriving the church of control over the selection of those who
will personify its beliefs.  By imposing an unwanted minister, the
state infringes the Free Exercise Clause, which protects a religious
group’s right to shape its own faith and mission through its
appointments.  According the state the power to determine which
individuals will minister to the faithful also violates the Establish-
ment Clause, which prohibits government involvement in such
ecclesiastical decisions.38
32. Id. at 701–02 (citing EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church &
Sch., 597 F.3d 769, 778–81 (6th Cir. 2010)).
33. Id. at 702.
34. Id. at 703.
35. Id. at 704.
36. Id. (citing Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976);
Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94 (1952); Wat-
son v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871)).
37. Id. at 705; see also Douglas Laycock, Hosanna-Tabor and the Ministerial Exception,
35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 839, 850 (2012) (“For forty years, the judges of the trial and
appellate courts have said, with remarkable unanimity, that they cannot decide these
cases.”).
38. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706; see also Paul Horwitz, Act III of the Ministerial
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Thus, the Court held that the First Amendment provided a minis-
terial exception to employment discrimination law.  The Court noted
that this interpretation accords with the text of the First Amendment,
which gives “special solicitude” to the rights of religious organiza-
tions.39  “When a minister who has been fired sues her church alleging
that her termination was discriminatory, the First Amendment has
struck the balance for us.  The church must be free to choose those
who will guide it on its way.”40
The Court proceeded to reject the EEOC and Perich’s contention
that Employment Division v. Smith41 foreclosed the possibility of a ministe-
rial exception being recognized under the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment.42 Smith stands for the proposition that “the right of
free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply
with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that
the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes
(or proscribes).”43  The Court explained that though the ADA’s prohi-
bition on retaliatory firing was a “valid and neutral law of general appli-
cability,” Smith was distinguishable because it involved “government
regulation of only outward physical acts,” whereas Hosanna-Tabor
involved “government interference with an internal church decision
that affects the faith and mission of the church itself.”44
B. The Scope of the Ministerial Exception
After determining a ministerial exception did exist, the Court then
set out to determine whether Perich qualified as a “minister,” thereby
triggering the exception.  The Chief Justice opted for a flexible
approach, rejecting the adoption of any “rigid formula.”45  The Court
considered how Hosanna-Tabor held Perich out as a minister, Perich’s
ized to intervene in life at the heart of the church.  At a deep level, these questions lie
beyond the reach of the state altogether.  The two kingdoms of temporal and spiritual
authority, of church and state, constitute two separate sovereigns.”).
39. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706.
40. Id. at 710.
41. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
42. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706; see also Caroline Mala Corbin, The Irony of
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 951,
954–57 (2012) (criticizing this distinction).
43. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706 (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 879).
44. Id. at 707.  This language has precipitated much discussion on an “internal
church decisions” exception to the Smith doctrine. See, e.g., Carl H. Esbeck, A Religious
Organization’s Autonomy in Matters of Self-Governance: Hosanna-Tabor and the First Amend-
ment, 13 J. FED. SOC’Y 168, 169 (2012) (“The types of lawsuits that fall into the Hosanna-
Tabor category of internal church governance are likely few because . . . no reply is permit-
ted based on governmental interests.  That is, once it is determined that a suit falls within
the subject-matter class of church governance, there is no judicial balancing.”); Michael
W. McConnell, Reflections on Hosanna-Tabor, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 821, 834–35
(2012) (“The Court’s analysis raises many questions.  Future litigants will want to know:
What are ‘outwards physical acts’?  Are some acts ‘inward’?  Are some acts not ‘physical’?
. . . Are there any religiously motivated acts by individuals, as opposed to religious organi-
zations, that qualify for protection because they are not outward or physical? . . . What is
‘an internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the church itself’?”).
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title of minister, the training Perich had undergone to become a
“called” minister, and the fact that Perich held herself out as a minister
by accepting a formal call and claiming a special housing allowance.46
Finally, the Court looked to Perich’s job duties, which included teach-
ing religion four days a week, leading students in prayer three times a
day, taking students to chapel once a week, and leading the liturgy
about twice a year.  “In light of these considerations—the formal title
given Perich by the Church, the substance reflected in that title, her
own use of that title, and the important religious functions she per-
formed for the church—we conclude that Perich was a minister cov-
ered by the ministerial exception.”47
The Court explained that the Sixth Circuit committed three errors
in concluding that Perich was not a minister: it neglected to consider
the fact that Perich was a commissioned minister, relied too much on
the fact that “lay” teachers performed similar duties to “called” teach-
ers, and overemphasized that Perich performed secular duties for a
majority of her work days.48
Before concluding, the Court disposed of two final arguments put
forth by Perich and the EEOC.  First, the Court explained that Perich
seeking damages and not reinstatement was immaterial to its analysis
and no less of an infringement on the First Amendment.49  The Court
stated that granting relief in the form of damages would depend on a
finding that Hosanna-Tabor wrongly terminated Perich, precisely the
determination the Court was unwilling to make.50  Additionally, the
Court rejected the argument that Hosanna-Tabor was liable because its
asserted religious reason for firing Perich was pretextual.  The Court
explained that this argument “misses the point” of the ministerial
exception, which “is not to safeguard a church’s decision to fire a minis-
ter only when it is made for a religious reason.”51  Instead, the excep-
tion “ensures that the authority to select and control who will minister
46. Id. at 707–08.
47. Id. at 708.  Justice Thomas parted ways with the majority in his analysis of who
qualifies as a minister, explaining that under his view the Religion Clauses compel defer-
ence to a religious organization’s “good-faith” determination of who qualifies as a minis-
ter. Id. at 710 (Thomas, J., concurring).
48. Id. at 709 (majority opinion) (“The issue before us, however, is not one that can
be resolved by a stopwatch.”).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.  Commentary on this particular point was sharply divided. Compare Laycock,
supra note 37, at 849–50 (“Even if there is no doctrinal issue at stake, the evaluation of a
minister’s performance is a decision reserved to the church . . . . Whether or not there is a
doctrinal reason . . . evaluation of a minister’s qualifications or performance is committed
to the churches.”), with Leslie Griffin, The Sins of Hosanna-Tabor, 88 IND. L.J. 981, 994
(2013) (“[The Court] ruled that religious employers enjoy absolute First Amendment
protection to dismiss their ‘ministers’ even when no religious issue is involved.  In other
words, religious freedom trumps the antidiscrimination laws even when no religious dis-
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to the faithful—a matter ‘strictly ecclesiastical’—is the church’s
alone.”52
Finally, and of specific relevance to this Note, the Court concluded
by explicitly limiting the scope of its holding to the employment dis-
crimination context:
We express no view on whether the exception bars other types of
suits, including actions by employees alleging breach of contract
or tortious conduct by their religious employers.  There will be
time enough to address the applicability of the exception to other
circumstances if and when they arise.53
Thus, one of the key questions that remains after Hosanna-Tabor is
whether the ministerial exception will be treated as a categorical bar to
a minister’s claim that he was terminated in violation of his contract.
Part II of this Note explores how courts have handled this question
both before and after Hosanna-Tabor.
II. BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIMS AND THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION
Many courts—both prior and subsequent to Hosanna-Tabor—have
addressed the ministerial exception’s applicability to contract claims.
Recall that courts do not find the ministerial exception to bar all con-
tract suits by a minister against the religious organization that employs
him.54  The ministerial exception applies when a religious organiza-
tion’s right to select and remove its clergy is at stake.55  Thus, the rele-
vant inquiry is whether the ministerial exception bars a minister’s claim
that he was terminated in violation of his employment contract.  This
Part analyzes cases before and after Hosanna-Tabor addressing this issue.
Section II.A explains that prior to Hosanna-Tabor, a majority of
courts summarily dismissed contract claims of wrongful termination
under the First Amendment.  However, some courts considered to what
degree interpreting the contractual provision at stake would actually
require the court to become enmeshed in ecclesiastical matters.  These
courts evinced a willingness to hear contractual claims that did not
involve substantive religious determinations.  This Section focuses on
the recent history of the ministerial exception, leaving analysis of the
historical roots of the ministerial exception for Section III.A.  Section
II.B discusses contract claims by ministers subsequent to Hosanna-Tabor.
Section II.B explains that post-Hosanna-Tabor, courts appear even more
willing to summarily dismiss of ministers’ contract claims of wrongful
termination, even when interpreting the contract would not require the
52. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 709 (quoting Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of
Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94, 119 (1952)).
53. Id. at 710; see also McConnell, supra note 44, at 835 (“[The Court’s limitation of
the holding to the employment discrimination context] is a commendable example of
judicial minimalism; the Court decides the case, and states a general principle, but does
not try to work out all its implications in advance, in the abstract.”).
54. See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text.
55. See Klouda v. Sw. Baptist Theological Seminary, 543 F. Supp. 2d 594, 611 (N.D.
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court to delve into religious doctrine, but merely to apply neutral prin-
ciples of law.
A. The Ministerial Exception and Contract Claims Pre-Hosanna-Tabor
Generally, courts prior to Hosanna-Tabor held that a minister’s con-
tract claim of wrongful termination was barred by the First Amendment
regardless of whether the substance of the claim involved any doctrinal
determinations.56  These courts regularly found that reviewing church
employment determinations was per se a violation of the First Amend-
ment.57  While courts acknowledged that civil adjudication of disputes
involving church “fraud or collusion” was permissible, they generally
refused to inquire further about the substance of the contract claim.58
However, a number of courts were more willing to adjudicate
wrongful termination contract suits when doing so did not pose a risk
of entanglement in ecclesiastical affairs.  The seminal case engaging in
this type of analysis is Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of United
Methodist Church.59  In Minker, plaintiff Ralph Minker, a Methodist min-
ister, filed suit against his employer, the United Methodist Church,
alleging age discrimination and two claims of breach of contract.60
Minker’s first breach of contract claim was based on the Methodist
Book of Discipline—“the book of law of the United Methodist
Church”—which Minker argued constituted a binding contract
between the church and its ministers.61  A section of the Book of Disci-
pline forbade appointment decisions based on age, which Minker
argued the church violated.  His second breach of contract claim was
predicated upon a promise the district superintendent made to Minker
regarding a transfer to a more suitable parish at the earliest time possi-
ble, a promise Minker argued the superintendent and his church did
not live up to.62
The D.C. Circuit affirmed dismissal of both the employment dis-
crimination claim and the contract claim based on the Methodist Book
of Discipline.63  The court dismissed the contract claim based on the
Book of Discipline because interpreting the provision would require
the court to make determinations that are “highly subjective, spiritual,
and ecclesiastical in nature.”64  However, the court found that the First
Amendment did not bar Minker’s claim of breach of oral contract.  “A
church is always free to burden its activities voluntarily through con-
56. See, e.g., Lewis v. Seventh Day Adventists Lake Region Conference, 978 F.2d 940,
942–43 (6th Cir. 1992); Natal v. Christian and Missionary Alliance, 878 F.2d 1575,
1576–78 (1st Cir. 1989); see also Overstreet, supra note 6, at 283 & nn.91–92 (collecting
cases).
57. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Thomas, 789 F.2d 392, 393–96 (6th Cir. 1986).
58. Id. (citing Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 711–13
(1976)).
59. 894 F.2d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
60. Id. at 1355.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1358.
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tracts, and such contracts are fully enforceable in civil court,” the court
explained.65  Citing Jones v. Wolf,66 the court described how civil courts
“may always resolve contracts governing ‘the manner in which churches
own property, hire employees, or purchase goods.’”67  In turning to the
oral promise allegedly made to Minker, the court explained:
As a theoretical matter, the issue of breach of contract can be
adduced by a fairly direct inquiry into whether appellant’s super-
intendent promised him a more suitable congregation, whether
appellant gave consideration in exchange for that promise, and
whether such congregations became available but were not
offered to Pastor Minker.  Similarly, Minker’s injury can be reme-
died without court oversight.  Money damages alone would suffice
since Minker already has a new pastorship.  Maintaining a suit, by
itself, will not necessarily create an excessive entanglement.  Fur-
thermore, as the remedy would be limited to the award of money
damages, we see no potential for distortion of church appoint-
ment decisions from requiring that the Church not make empty,
misleading promises to its clergy.68
The court closed by introducing a caveat into its decision, noting
that if in resolving the contract claim the district court was forced to
inquire into “matters of ecclesiastical policy,” the court could always
grant summary judgment to avoid an “excessive entanglement” with
religion.69  In other words, the court found that Minker was “entitled to
prove up his claim of breach of an oral contract to the extent he can
divine a course clear of the Church’s ecclesiastical domain.”70
Several courts after Minker similarly analyzed whether the First
Amendment barred a minister’s wrongful termination suit by asking
whether interpretation of the substance of the contract would require
ecclesiastical determinations or merely application of neutral principles
of law.71  Some courts found that interpreting the contractual provi-
sions at issue did not require courts to probe into matters of church
doctrine and thus allowed the contract claims to proceed.  For exam-
ple, in Petruska v. Gannon University, the plaintiff, former University
65. Id. (citing Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 714 (1871)).
66. 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
67. Minker, 894 F.2d at 1359 (quoting Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 606 (1979)).
68. Id. at 1360.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1361.
71. See, e.g., Friedlander v. Port Jewish Ctr., 347 F. App’x 654, 655 (2d Cir. 2009);
Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 310 (3d Cir. 2006); Bollard v. Cal. Province of
the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 949 (9th Cir. 1999); Leavy v. Congregation Beth Shalom,
490 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1025–28 (N.D. Iowa 2007); Bible Way Church of Our Lord Jesus
Christ of Apostolic Faith v. Beards, 680 A.2d 419, 432–33 (D.C. 1996); Jenkins v. Trinity
Evangelical Lutheran Church, 825 N.E.2d 1206, 1213 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005); Music v. United
Methodist Church, 864 S.W.2d 286, 288 (Ky. 1993); McKelvey v. Pierce, 800 A.2d 840, 851
(N.J. 2002); Mundie v. Christ United Church of Christ, 987 A.2d 794, 798–802 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2009); El-Farra v. Sayyed, 226 S.W.3d 792 (Ark. 2006).  For a discussion of the El-Farra
case and how Sharia law intersects with the ministerial exception, see Eun-Jung Katherine
Kim, Islamic Law in American Courts: The Good, Bad, and Unsustainable Uses, 28 NOTRE DAME
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Chaplain of Gannon University, brought state contract claims alleging
that her duties as leader of the Chaplain’s Division and member of the
President’s Staff were removed in violation of her employment agree-
ment.72  The Third Circuit allowed the claim to proceed past a motion
to dismiss, explaining that “[e]nforcement of a promise, willingly made
and supported by consideration, in no way constitutes a state-imposed
limit upon a church’s free exercise rights.”73  The court did explain,
however, that if resolution of the claim yielded “excessive government
entanglement with religion,” the suit would need to be dismissed.74
Similarly, in McKelvey v. Pierce, the New Jersey Supreme Court
found that the plaintiff, a former Catholic Seminarian, could pursue his
claims of breach of implied contract and breach of the implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing75 based on allegations that priests of
his diocese subjected him to unwanted sexual advances.76  The court
echoed Minker, explaining that “[t]he critical factor in the application
of the ministerial exception to a given cause of action must be that
resolution of the claim requires an impermissible inquiry into the pro-
priety of a decision of core ecclesiastical concern . . . where the dispute is
truly religious.”77  In each of these cases the decisive factor was the
court’s determination that interpretation of the contractual provision at
issue would not cause the court to become excessively entangled in
ecclesiastical matters.
Other courts engaged in a similar analysis but found that interpre-
tation of the contractual provisions at issue would cause excessive entan-
glement in core ecclesiastical matters and was thus barred by the First
Amendment.  For instance, in Friedlander v. Port Jewish Center, the Sec-
ond Circuit found that the ministerial exception barred determination
of whether a rabbi was terminated for “gross misconduct or willful neg-
lect of duty” in accordance with his employment contract.78  The court
reasoned that resolving this dispute would “involve impermissible judi-
cial inquiry into religious matters.”79  Similarly, the Supreme Court of
72. Petruska, 462 F.3d at 310.
73. Id.
74. Id. (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971))
75. The court explained that the plaintiff was free to argue that his agreement with
the Diocese, like all secular contracts, carried with it an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing and that the defendants’ conduct violated this covenant. McKelvey, 800
A.2d at 859.  Many states recognize the claim of breach of the implied duty of good faith
and fair dealing. See Fortune v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1256 (Mass.
1977); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981).  Though the court in
McKelvey held this claim was not barred by the ministerial exception, the voluntariness
rationale for holding wrongful termination claims outside of the scope of the ministerial
exception, see infra Section III.B, does not apply for claims of breach of the implied cove-
nant.  A religious organization cannot be said to voluntarily submit to the implied cove-
nant the same way it voluntarily submits to an express contract.  Thus, this Note does not
argue that a minister’s claims against his employer for breach of the implied covenant are
outside of the scope of the ministerial exception.
76. McKelvey, 800 A.2d at 852.
77. Id. at 856.






      05/07/2014   15:37:06
34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 203 Side A      05/07/2014   15:37:06
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\28-1\NDE111.txt unknown Seq: 13  2-MAY-14 7:37
2014] THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION AFTER HOSANNA-TABOR 395
Kentucky found in Music v. United Methodist Church that the First
Amendment barred a minister’s claim that he was placed on a leave of
absence in violation of the Book of Discipline of the United Methodist
Church.80  As in Minker, the Court found that interpretation of the
Book of Discipline was an inherently ecclesiastical matter that a court
could not perform.81
These cases indicate a willingness of some courts prior to Hosanna-
Tabor to ask whether the substance of a minister’s wrongful termination
claim against his employer is ecclesiastical in nature or could be
resolved using “neutral methods of proof.”82
B. The Ministerial Exception and Contract Claims Post-Hosanna-Tabor
Courts subsequent to Hosanna-Tabor appear even more willing to
summarily dismiss ministers’ wrongful termination suits under the min-
isterial exception.  While one court indicated a willingness to inquire
whether interpretation of an employment contract would “entangle
[the court] with the internal doctrinal policies of [the church],”83 most
read Hosanna-Tabor to bar all wrongful termination claims by ministers
regardless of the substance of the employment contract.
In DeBruin v. St. Patrick Congregation,84 the Wisconsin Supreme
Court determined that the ministerial exception barred a claim for
wrongful termination by Kathleen DeBruin, the Director of Faith For-
mation at St. Patrick’s Church.85  DeBruin’s employment contract pro-
vided that “the Director of Faith Formation shall not be discharged
during the term of this contract, without good and sufficient cause,
which shall be determined by the Parish.”86  St. Patrick’s terminated
DeBruin in 2009 and she filed suit for damages through the remainder
of her contract, arguing that her termination lacked “good and suffi-
80. Music v. United Methodist Church, 864 S.W.2d 286, 288 (Ky. 1993)
81. Id.
82. Minker v. Balt. Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354,
1360 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
83. Order Granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Woodward v.
Saint John Vianney Theological Seminary, No. 2011 CV6277, 2012 WL 7746927 (Colo.
Dist. Ct. Sept. 13, 2012).  In Woodward, a Colorado district court was confronted with the
question whether the ministerial exception barred wrongful termination claims by Dr.
Michael Woodward, previously an assistant professor at Saint John Vianney Theological
Seminary (SJV).   Woodward was terminated after posting pictures on his Facebook page
predicting that the Catholic Church would one day openly accept gay priests and argued
that his termination was without “just cause” and in violation the Faculty Handbook,
which guaranteed “freedom in discussing subject matter both in and out of the class-
room.” Id. at 10–11.  The court found that the ministerial exception, as explicated by the
Court in Hosanna-Tabor, barred any argument that Dr. Woodward’s termination lacked
“just cause,” because resolution of this matter would necessarily entangle the court in
SJV’s doctrinal policies. Id.  Further, the court dismissed Dr. Woodward’s argument that
the termination violated the Faculty Handbook guarantee of academic freedom, conclud-
ing that evaluation of the meaning of “academic freedom” in the context of a Catholic
Seminary would draw the court into “forbidden doctrinal waters.” Id. at 11.
84. 816 N.W.2d 878 (Wis. 2012).
85. Id. at 882.
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cient cause.”87  A plurality of the court believed that the contract dis-
pute could not be resolved without inquiring as to what “good and
sufficient cause” entailed, an inquiry that the court could not make
without transgressing the First Amendment.88  The plurality explained
that though DeBruin’s claim was contractual in nature, “the First
Amendment protections that drove the result in Hosanna-Tabor are the
same protections that bear on [her] claim.”89  Justice Bradley, in dis-
sent, argued that the ministerial exception did not bar DeBruin’s con-
tract claim because of factors distinguishing contract claims from
employment discrimination claims.90  Justice Bradley admitted that if
facts surrounding DeBruin’s termination caused the court to “wade[ ]
into the doctrinal waters” of church policy, the doctrine of ecclesiastical
abstention would bar the suit.91  However, Justice Bradley saw nothing
in the record indicating this was the case and advocated remanding the
case to the circuit court to make this determination.
Broader language in the DeBruin plurality’s opinion suggests that
the ministerial exception bars all wrongful termination claims by a min-
ister, even when interpreting the contractual language would not
require the court to make any ecclesiastical determinations at all.  The
DeBruin plurality explained that “the First Amendment gives St. Patrick
the absolute right to terminate DeBruin for any reason, or for no rea-
son, as it freely exercises its religious views.  It is the decision itself, i.e.,
who shall be the voice of St. Patrick, that affects the faith and mission of
the church.”92  This language suggests that the DeBruin plurality read
Hosanna-Tabor to mean that the ministerial exception bars wrongful ter-
mination suits regardless of whether the contract could be interpreted
using neutral principles of law.
This understanding of the ministerial exception, which is broader
than the pre-Hosanna-Tabor understanding, was adopted by the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals in Kant v. Lexington Theological Seminary,93 a case
that has attracted much national attention and is currently pending
before the Kentucky Supreme Court.94  In Kant, Laurence Kant, a man
of Jewish faith and scholar in Jewish studies, brought suit alleging that
Lexington Theological Seminary (LTS), a seminary affiliated with the
87. Id.
88. Id. at 887–91.
89. Id. at 890.
90. Id. at 902 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (“[A] church is always free to burden its activ-
ities voluntarily through contracts.” (citing Minker v. Balt. Annual Conference of United
Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1359 (D.C. Cir. 1990))).
91. Id. at 908.
92. Id. at 888 (plurality opinion).
93. No. 2011–CA–000004–MR, at *2 (Ky. Ct. App. July 27, 2012), available at http:/
/statecasefiles.justia.com/documents/kentucky/court-of-appeals/2011-ca-000004-mr.
pdf?ts=1343397799.
94. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. Kant has received national attention
because it presents a number of interesting issues, including whether a Jewish theologian
could be considered a minister of a Christian organization. Compare Alliance Defending
Freedom Brief, supra note 13, at 11 (arguing yes), with Griffin Brief, supra note 13, at 9–10
(arguing no).  This Note confines its discussion of Kant to the issue of whether the minis-
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Disciples of Christ, wrongfully terminated his employment.95  Mr. Kant
began teaching at LTS in 2000 and received tenure in 2006.  LTS’s
Faculty Handbook explained: “Tenure at Lexington Theological Semi-
nary means appointment to serve until retirement, resignation, or dis-
missal for adequate cause.”96  The Handbook further provided: “The
only grounds for dismissal of a tenured faculty member are moral delin-
quency, unambiguous failure to perform the responsibilities outlined in
this Handbook, or conduct detrimental to the Seminary.”97  In 2009,
because of unfavorable economic conditions, LTS declared financial
emergency and terminated Mr. Kant.  Mr. Kant filed suit for breach of
contract and LTS moved to dismiss on the grounds that the ministerial
exception barred the claims.
Judge Moore and Chief Judge Acree of the Kentucky Court of
Appeals, a majority of the panel, agreed that the ministerial exception
barred the suit.98  Chief Judge Acree explained that he read Hosanna-
Tabor to mean that “if we first decide that Kant is a minister and there-
fore the exception applies, we need not, and cannot, inquire into the
reason for firing.”99  The Chief Judge explained that the ministerial
exception is as “absolute as a rule of law can be,” leaving no room for
judicial scrutiny of a religious organization’s decisions to terminate
ministers.100   Judge Moore explained that “it does not matter that Kant
has fashioned his case around a contract cause of action; this does not
trump constitutional protections and freedoms of the church.”101
Notably, none of Chief Judge Acree’s analysis of the ministerial excep-
tion discusses whether the LTS Faculty Handbook could be interpreted
based on neutral principles of law, as opposed to religious doctrine; for
Chief Judge Acree, Hosanna-Tabor rendered this question irrelevant.
Case law post-Hosanna-Tabor thus reveals an emerging trend in
ministerial exception jurisprudence.  Relying on Hosanna-Tabor’s rea-
soning, courts appear less willing to inquire whether interpreting the
substance of the wrongful termination claim would actually lead to
excessive entanglement in ecclesiastical matters.  Instead, courts appear
willing to categorically refuse to adjudicate a minister’s claim that he
was wrongfully terminated under his employment contract.
III. THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION SHOULD NOT BAR A MINISTER’S
CONTRACT CLAIMS AGAINST HIS EMPLOYER
The question whether the ministerial exception should bar a min-
ister’s claim that he was wrongfully terminated under his employment
95. Kant, 2011–CA–000004–MR, at *2.
96. Id. at *4.
97. Id. at *5.
98. Id. at *24, *26 (Acree, C.J., concurring).  Notably, Chief Judge Acree disagreed
with Judge Moore’s conclusion that the doctrine of ecclesiastical abstention required dis-
missal of the suit. Id. at *26. Thus, a majority of the Kentucky Court of Appeals believed
the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine did not bar the suit.
99. Id. at *29–30.
100. Id. at *30 (citation omitted).
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contract has no simple or inevitable answer.102  On one hand, the core
concerns that drove the result in Hosanna-Tabor seem to be similarly
present in the context of contract claims. Hosanna-Tabor explained:
Requiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted minister, or
punishing a church for failing to do so, intrudes upon more than
a mere employment decision.  Such action interferes with the
internal governance of the church, depriving the church of con-
trol over the selection of those who will personify its beliefs.103
Contract claims of wrongful termination, no less than employment
discrimination claims, are punishing a church for failing to retain an
unwanted minister.  As Chief Justice Roberts plainly stated at the close
of Hosanna-Tabor: “The church must be free to choose those who will
guide it on its way.”104  This robust freedom protects not just the right
to decide to terminate a minister for religious reasons, but more
broadly protects the exclusive right to make this decision.105  In many
ways, adjudication of a wrongful termination contract claim deprives a
religious organization of the exclusive right to make employment deci-
sions in the same manner as adjudication of employment discrimina-
tion claims would.  Further, Hosanna-Tabor was not a case where the
balancing of religious liberty against other interests presented a close
call.  The Supreme Court unanimously agreed that the ministerial excep-
tion barred the suit.
But despite the broad language in Hosanna-Tabor and one-sided
result, there are compelling reasons not to extend the ministerial
exception to wrongful termination contract claims for damages.  This
Part addresses these reasons and argues that courts should not find con-
tract claims for damages barred by the ministerial exception.  First, Sec-
tion III.A discusses the historical ability of ministers to sue religious
organizations on valid contracts.  Section III.B then distinguishes con-
tract claims from employment discrimination claims because of the vol-
untary nature of contracts.  This Section argues that the voluntariness
of contracts mitigates Free Exercise Clause concerns present in
Hosanna-Tabor and provides independent reasons not to categorically
bar wrongful termination contract claims under the ministerial excep-
tion.  Section III.C discusses the detrimental effects for religious organi-
zations that would follow from a refusal to enforce a church’s
contractual obligations.  Finally, Section III.D argues that the ministe-
rial exception’s inapplicability to contract claims does not truly impair
religious freedom.  The doctrine of ecclesiastical abstention would still
102. Cf. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (“Candor compels acknowl-
edgement . . . that we can only dimly perceive the lines of demarcation in this extraordi-
narily sensitive area of constitutional law.”).
103. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694,
706 (2012).
104. Id. at 710.
105. Id. at 709; see also Berg et al., supra note 20, at 176 (“[The ministerial excep-
tion] rests on the overriding and foundational premise that there are some questions the
civil courts do not have the power to answer, some wrongs that a constitutional commit-





      05/07/2014   15:37:06
34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 205 Side A      05/07/2014   15:37:06
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\28-1\NDE111.txt unknown Seq: 17  2-MAY-14 7:37
2014] THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION AFTER HOSANNA-TABOR 399
bar those contract claims by a minister against his employer that would
require a court to become excessively entangled with religion.  This
more nuanced approach, though less absolute, strikes the appropriate
balance between the two fundamental values of church autonomy and
the mutuality of obligation.
As one final preliminary matter of clarification, this Part does not
argue that a minister’s contract claim against his employer should sur-
vive regardless of the remedy requested.  As many courts have recog-
nized,106 when a minister requests a remedy of reinstatement based on
a contractual violation, a church’s First Amendment interests are at
their apex; the ministerial exception must bar the suit. Scholars, too,
have acknowledged that “having courts forcibly reinstate ministers
raises deep religious liberty problems.”107  Requiring a religious organi-
zation to retain a minister imposes an enormous burden.  Further, as a
historical matter, government appointment of clergy was one of the pri-
mary attributes of an established church.108  While it is true that the
Court in Hosanna-Tabor rejected any distinction based on whether the
plaintiff requested a remedy of damages or reinstatement in the con-
text of employment discrimination claims,109 the calculus in the con-
text of contract claims need not be the same.  Courts regularly refuse to
order specific performance in personal service contracts while allowing
damages.110
A. Historical Status of a Minister’s Contract Claim Against His Employer
The historical record establishes that, at the time of the Founding,
adjudication of a minister’s contract claims against his employer was
not thought to offend the First Amendment.111  Though governmental
appointment of church ministers was of great concern to the Foun-
ders,112 courts regularly resolved ministers’ contract claims of wrongful
106. See, e.g., Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 950 (9th
Cir. 1999) (“Had [plaintiff] brought a state law claim for breach of contract with an asso-
ciated remedy of reinstatement, that would run afoul of the Free Exercise Clause because
the remedy would require the church to employ [plaintiff], thereby interfering with the
church’s constitutionally protected choice of its ministers.”); Minker v. Balt. Annual Con-
ference of the United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1360 (D.C. Cir. 1990); McKelvey
v. Pierce, 800 A.2d 840, 859 (N.J. 2002).
107. Christopher C. Lund, In Defense of the Ministerial Exception, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1, 38
(2011) (discussing the “reinstatement problem”).
108. See Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding,
Part I: Establishment of Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2015, 2136–44 (2003).
109. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 709 (“An award of [damages] would operate as
a penalty on the Church for terminating an unwanted minister, and would be no less
prohibited by the First Amendment than an order overturning the termination.”); see also
Lund, supra note 107, at 40 (“But giving front pay in lieu of reinstatement does not really
fix the core problem. It still gives the government control over the church’s clergy, just in
a different way.”).
110. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 367(1) (1981) (“A promise to
render personal service will not be specifically enforced.”).
111. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Employment Lawyers Association in
Support of Respondents at 4–11, Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (No. 10-553)
[hereinafter National Employment Lawyers Brief].
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termination against their employers as early as 1799.113  Given the fun-
damental role of history in First Amendment jurisprudence,114 this his-
torical evidence provides a strong reason not to extend the ministerial
exception to cover contract claims.
In Runkel v. Winemuller, Justice Chase, then Chief Judge of the Gen-
eral Court of Maryland, issued a writ of mandamus ordering restoration
of Reverend William Runkel as minister of the High Dutch Reformed
Christian Church in Fredericktown, Maryland.115  Runkel alleged that
he was forcibly removed from his position as minister in violation of his
contract, which guaranteed a ten-year term and emoluments consisting
of eighteen cords of wood annually, eighty pounds annually, and use of
a parsonage house.  Justice Chase no doubt understood the crucial role
that ministers play in religious organization.  He explained, “The prin-
ciples of the Christian religion cannot be diffused, and its doctrines
generally propagated, without . . . teachers and ministers, to explain the
scriptures to the people, and to enforce an observance of the precepts
of religion by their preaching and living.”116  Nevertheless, “pastors,
teachers, and ministers, of every denomination of Christians, are
equally entitled to the protection of the law, and to the enjoyment of
their religious and temporal rights.”117  Justice Chase granted the
request for a writ of mandamus, finding that Runkel had a valid claim
against the elders of the religious organization, “who signed the voca-
tion and contract for the emoluments stipulated to be provided.”118
Similarly, in Avery v. Inhabitants of Tyringham, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts rejected the argument that religious organiza-
tions could dismiss a minister for any reason notwithstanding contrac-
tual obligations.119  In Avery, minister Joseph Avery filed suit against the
parish of Tyringham for damages resulting from the parish’s alleged
breach of his employment contract.120  The parish contended that it
had an absolute right to terminate the minister, a right it argued was
inherent in the parish’s ability to exercise its faith and protected by the
Massachusetts Constitution.121  The three sitting judges all rejected this
contention, each writing seriatim to express his opinion.  Judge Parker
explained: “It is true the religious societies are left at liberty to make
such a contract, and for such term of time as shall be agreed between
them and their minister; but the contract once made, is subject to all
such rules of law as govern other engagements.”122  Judge Parker fur-
113. See, e.g., Runkel v. Winemuller, 4 H. & McH. 429 (Md. 1799).
114. Cf. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 294 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (“[T]he line we must draw between the permissible and the
impermissible is one which accords with history and faithfully reflects the understanding
of the Founding Fathers.”).
115. Runkel, 4 H. & McH. at 452.
116. Id. at 450.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 451.
119. 3 Mass. (2 Tyng) 160 (Mass. 1807).
120. Id. at 161.
121. Id. at 168 (Parker, J.).
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ther questioned how the parish’s argument could be squared with the
mutual intentions of the parties when making the contract and
expressed concerns about the instability a ruling would inject into the
parish’s relationship with the minister.123  Judge Sedgwick agreed,
describing the consequences that would derive from such a result as
“mischievous in the extreme.”124  Judge Sedgwick and Chief Judge Par-
sons questioned whether religious organizations would even be able to
attract ministers if such an interpretation were adopted.125  The Chief
Judge concluded: “[A] town [has] no right to violate its own contracts
solemnly and deliberately made.”126
Runkel, Avery, and other cases in early American jurisprudence127
are illustrative of the fact that early American judges did not believe a
minister’s contract claim against his employer implicated the First
Amendment. Further evidence comes from the state constitutions of
Massachusetts, Maine, Connecticut, and New Hampshire, each of which
secured to religious societies the exclusive right to elect their own pub-
lic ministers and contract with them for services.128  For example, arti-
cle III of part I of the Massachusetts Constitution read: “The several
towns, parishes, precincts, and other bodies politic, or religious socie-
ties, shall, at all times, have the exclusive right of electing their public
teachers, and of contracting with them for their support and mainte-
nance.”129  This provision, like the similar ones in the Maine, Connecti-
cut, and New Hampshire constitutions,130 is an embodiment of the idea
that religious institutions must be free to select who will minister to the
faithful.131  But additionally, the fact that these state constitutions pro-
tected the right of religious organizations to contract with ministers
lends support to the idea that these contracts were expected to be effec-
tuated by courts.  The Supreme Court of Massachusetts adopted this
understanding of the Massachusetts Constitution in Avery.132
To be sure, government appointment of church personnel was one
of the key elements of an established church and of great concern of
the Founders.133  But, as the historical evidence establishes, resolution
123. Id. at 170.
124. Id. at 173 (Sedgwick, J.).
125. See id. (“Would ministers, who regarded the comfort of their families, of their
own personal quiet and security, be willing to make a contract on such terms?”); id. at 177
(Parsons, C.J.) (“A consequence of this power in a parish, will be the deterring of young
men of information and genius, from entering into the clerical profession . . . .”).
126. Id. at 179 (Parsons, C.J.).
127. National Employment Lawyers Brief, supra note 111, at 4 n.6 (citing contract
actions by dismissed ministers throughout the 1800s).
128. See Joshua Dunlap, When Big Brother Plays God: The Religion Clauses, Title VII, and
the Ministerial Exception, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2005, 2016 (2007).
129. MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. III (amended 1833).
130. See Dunlap, supra note 128, at 2016–18.
131. Id. (“[T]he framers of the New England constitutions, in order to grant relig-
ious freedom genuine protection, sought to ensure that civil government could not regu-
late the selection of church employees.”).
132. Avery, 3 Mass. (2 Tyng) 160, 169 (Mass. 1807).
133. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct.
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of a minister’s wrongful termination claim is not the kind of govern-
ment appointment of church personnel about which the First Amend-
ment is concerned.  This historical evidence of adjudicating contract
disputes stands in stark contrast to the regular refusal of courts to adju-
dicate employment discrimination claims by ministers against their
employers under the ministerial exception.  Not long after the passage
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Fifth Circuit found a
minister’s employment discrimination suit barred by the First Amend-
ment.134  By the time of Hosanna-Tabor, the courts of appeals have uni-
formly recognized the ministerial exception’s existence.135  Thus, the
historical record of judicial resolution of a minister’s contract claims
against his employer provides a compelling reason for finding contract
claims beyond the scope of the ministerial exception.
B. Voluntariness of Contracts
Contractual obligations, as opposed to employment discrimination
laws, are self-imposed obligations from which a church benefits.  They
are private, not public, in nature.  In all likelihood, whether the con-
tract be express or implied through informal sources, the religious
organization drafted the contract’s language.  The voluntary nature of
contractual obligations ameliorates Free Exercise concerns present in
Hosanna-Tabor and provides another compelling reason not to extend
the ministerial exception to wrongful termination contract claims.
As the D.C. Circuit recognized in Minker v. Baltimore Annual Confer-
ence of United Methodist Church, “a church is always free to burden its
activities voluntarily through contracts, and such contracts are fully
enforceable in civil court.”136  Even courts finding employment discrim-
ination claims barred under the ministerial exception have explained
that religious organizations “may be held liable . . . upon their valid
contracts.”137
A court that determines a religious organization terminated a min-
ister in violation of federal employment law imposes a state standard
upon the hiring and firing practices of a religious organization.138  But
a court that interprets a contract to which a religious organization
agreed of its own volition imposes no state standard.139  Free Exercise
‘free exercise thereof,’ the Religion Clauses ensured that the new Federal Government—
unlike the English Crown—would have no role in filling ecclesiastical offices.”); Berg et
al., supra note 20, at 179–84; McConnell, supra note 108, at 2136 (“The power to appoint
and remove ministers and other church officials is the power to control the church.”).
134. See McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560 (5th Cir. 1972).
135. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 705.
136. Minker v. Balt. Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.3d
1354, 1359 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
137. Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1171
(4th Cir. 1985).
138. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706.
139. See Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 310 (3d Cir. 2006); DeBruin v. St.
Patrick Congregation, 816 N.W.2d 878, 906 (Wis. 2012) (Bradley, J., dissenting); see also
Overstreet, supra note 6, at 284 (“Unlike anti-discrimination legislation, which imposes





      05/07/2014   15:37:06
34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 207 Side A      05/07/2014   15:37:06
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\28-1\NDE111.txt unknown Seq: 21  2-MAY-14 7:37
2014] THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION AFTER HOSANNA-TABOR 403
concerns at the heart of Hosanna-Tabor are simply not present when a
religious organization is deciding the standards by which it is judged.
The Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause together drove the
result in Hosanna-Tabor.  The absence of Free Exercise concerns in the
context of contract claims militates against stretching the ministerial
exception to categorically bar wrongful termination contract claims.
A common response to the argument that Free Exercise concerns
are assuaged when a church freely burdens itself with a contract is that
contract law “does not trump constitutional protections and freedoms
of the church.”140  Put otherwise, the argument states that a religious
organization cannot waive its religious freedom by agreeing to an
employment contract.  The idea that churches cannot contract away
religious freedom is an intuitively attractive one given the emphasis in
American jurisprudential tradition on the separation of church and
state.141  However, Hosanna-Tabor itself seems to refute the argument
that a religious organization is unable to waive some of its religious free-
dom.  The Court, in footnote four, resolved a circuit split by explaining
that the ministerial exception is an affirmative defense to employment
discrimination claims, not a jurisdictional bar.142  Thus, the ministerial
exception is not a structural limitation on civil courts’ jurisdiction;
should a religious organization choose to waive the ministerial excep-
tion defense, a suit for employment discrimination could proceed.  This
lends strong support to the idea that a church could similarly waive
some religious freedom by voluntarily agreeing to be bound by a con-
tractual instrument.  In both instances, the Free Exercise rights of the
religious organization are not encroached upon because they are acting
of their own volition.  A religious organization remains free to terminate
ministers as it pleases, limited only by any secular bounds it previously
imposed upon itself.  If religious organizations do wish to have the abil-
ity to terminate a minister for any reason at all, they remain free to say
so in the employment contract.
Thus the voluntariness of contractual obligations and consequent
amelioration of Free Exercise concerns that drove the result in
Hosanna-Tabor provide a second reason not to extend the ministerial
exception to bar contract claims.
contracts results from a voluntary decision by the organization to burden itself.” (footnote
omitted)).
140. Kant v. Lexington Theological Seminary, No. 2011–CA–000004–MR, at *24
(Ky. Ct. App. July 27, 2012), available at http://statecasefiles.justia.com/documents/ken-
tucky/court-of-appeals/2011-ca-000004-mr.pdf?ts=1343397799.
141. See Berg et al., supra note 20, at 177–79.
142. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 709 n.4; see also Michael A. Helfand, Religion’s
Footnote Four: Church Autonomy as Arbitration, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1891, 1892 (2013) (sug-
gesting that Hosanna-Tabor’s footnote four “rests on a radically new conception of the
relationship between church and state, gesturing towards an increasingly symbiotic rela-
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C. Effects on Church-Minister Relations
If ministers’ wrongful termination claims are barred by the ministe-
rial exception, termination clauses “would not be worth the paper they
are printed on.”143  All termination clauses, even ones limiting termina-
tion to defined circumstances that are not ecclesiastical in nature,
would be unenforceable in court.  Such a rule would adverse conse-
quences for ministers and religious organizations.
To begin with, great uncertainty and instability would be injected
into the relationship between a minister and the religious organization
that employs him.144  The Fifth Circuit has described the relationship
between a religious organization and its ministers as its “lifeblood.”145
This relationship is undoubtedly a delicate one, dependent upon trust.
If a church can terminate a minister at any time, for any reason, even if
explicitly in violation of the terms of his employment contract, the trust
inherent in this relationship could be damaged.  These concerns do not
turn on the cynical assumption that churches will in fact terminate min-
isters in violation of their contracts.  This instability would exist regard-
less of whether the church would even consider terminating the
minister; merely knowing that the religious employer could do so would
introduce precariousness into the church-minister relationship.  Leav-
ing a minister’s job security less certain could even lead to adverse
effects for the congregation as a whole.146  This concern is especially
poignant given the Hosanna-Tabor Court’s flexible definition of who
constitutes a minister.147
Consequently, religious organizations may place themselves at a
competitive disadvantage in attracting employees.  To be sure, myriad
considerations beyond (and more significant than) the enforceability of
an employment contract impact a minister’s decision to join a parish.
However, some individuals who might otherwise become, for example,
a parochial school teacher may look elsewhere out of a concern for job
stability.148  If termination provisions were unenforceable in court,
“[w]ould ministers, who regarded the comfort of their families, or their
own personal quiet and security, be willing to make a contract on such
terms?”149  Admittedly, any disincentivization to join a religious organi-
zation as a minister would be difficult to show or measure.  But, given
that the definition of “minister” in Hosanna-Tabor is broad enough to
143. DeBruin, 816 N.W.2d at 907 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
144. See Avery v. Inhabitants of Tyringham, 3 Mass. (2 Tyng) 160, 170 (Mass. 1807)
(Parker, J.) (“The minister, who is settled to-day, may be dismissed to-morrow.”).
145. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558 (5th Cir. 1972).
146. See DeBruin, 816 N.W.2d at 912 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
147. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707 (considering “all the circumstances” of
plaintiff’s employment in determining her to be a minister); see also id. at 711–12 (Alito,
J., concurring) (deemphasizing the majority’s consideration of plaintiff’s title of “minis-
ter” and arguing that the ministerial exception covers all church employees who perform
“key functions” of the church).
148. See Avery, 3 Mass. (2 Tyng) at 178 (Parsons, C.J.) (arguing that allowing a par-
ish the power to terminate without reason would “deter[ ] young men of information and
genius, from entering into the clerical profession”); DeBruin, 816 N.W.2d at 907 & n.9.
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include positions like parochial school teachers,150 it is reasonable to
think that religious organizations may struggle to compete with secular
employers who can provide greater job stability.
Moreover, finding wrongful termination claims outside the scope
of the ministerial exception will incentivize drafting of employment
agreements and handbooks that accurately reflect the true nature of
the employment relationship.  Though a duty to treat ministerial
employees equitably after Hosanna-Tabor surely exists regardless of legal
obligations,151 potential liability on contracts provides an added incen-
tive to religious organizations to represent accurately the nature of the
employment relationship to their ministers.
Finally, while the Supreme Court has endorsed the notion that an
individual who joins a religious organization implicitly consents to be
bound by the decisions of ecclesiastic tribunals,152 that implicit consent
is notably absent in the context of a minister’s contract claims.   A min-
ister who signs an employment agreement exhibits implicit consent not
to be bound by the decision of the religious organization, but instead
by courts of law.  Thus, potential adverse effects on the church-minister
relationship provide yet another reason not to find wrongful termina-
tion claims categorically barred by the ministerial exception.
D. The Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine Adequately Protects
Religious Liberty
This Note argues that the ministerial exception should not bar
wrongful termination claims by a minister against his employer.  For
those wrongful termination actions that would require a court to make
determinations of a religious nature, the ecclesiastical abstention doc-
trine nonetheless bars the suit.  This Section argues the ecclesiastical
abstention doctrine sufficiently protects religious liberty interests and
appropriately balances these interests against the contract law’s interest
in mutuality of obligation.
The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine is the general body of case
law standing for the principle that civil courts cannot rule on matters
that are “strictly and purely ecclesiastical.”153  The Supreme Court in
Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral explained that religious organizations
have the “power to decide for themselves, free from state interference,
matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.”154
This doctrine is broader than the ministerial exception; it operates
150. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707.
151. See Horwitz, supra note 38, at 976.
152. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 729 (1871).
153. Id. at 733; see also Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian
Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952); Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a
Structural Restraint on Governmental Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1, 42–51 (1998) (describing this
doctrine).
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beyond just the realm of church employment decisions.155  Perhaps the
ministerial exception is best conceptualized as a specific application of
the doctrine of ecclesiastical abstention to the context of employment
discrimination claims.  As Chief Justice Roberts explained, “[w]hen a
minister who has been fired sues her church alleging that her termina-
tion was discriminatory, the First Amendment has struck the balance
for us.”156
The doctrine of ecclesiastical abstention coexists in our constitu-
tional jurisprudence with the principle that civil courts may always
resolve disputes involving a church when the dispute depends upon
“neutral principles of law.”157  In practice, courts regularly ask whether
resolution of a church dispute would cause “excessive entanglement”
with ecclesiastical matters or could be resolved solely by reference to
neutral principles of law.158  This is the proper inquiry for a court to
engage in when a minister brings a contract claim against his employer
for wrongful termination.  Instead of barring all ministers’ wrongful ter-
mination claims, this inquiry separates the wheat from the chaff; con-
tract claims that depend on neutral principles of law proceed, while
those requiring entanglement in ecclesiastical matters do not.159
Though this inquiry may lack the absoluteness of the ministerial
exception, it strikes the appropriate balance between religious liberty
and contract law’s interest in mutuality of obligation.  Mutuality of obli-
gation, as a doctrinal matter, is the idea that “unless both parties to an
agreement are bound, neither is bound.”160  The requirement of mutu-
ality of obligation has largely been rejected as a requirement for a valid
contract.161  But the idea that both parties to a contract should be able
to seek a remedy, or neither should, still resonates strongly in contract
law.162  Notions of fundamental fairness and equality under the law
yield a reflexive discomfort with the idea of a one-way-street of contrac-
tual liability.  Though situations exist where enforcement of one party’s
155. See Klouda v. Sw. Baptist Theological Seminary, 543 F. Supp. 2d 594, 611 (N.D.
Tex. 2008) (describing the relationship between the ministerial exception and the
broader ecclesiastical abstention doctrine).
156. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694,
710 (2012).
157. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 597 (1979).
158. See, e.g., Kant v. Lexington Theological Seminary, No. 2011–CA–000004–MR,
at *14 (Ky. Ct. App. July 27, 2012) (quoting Music v. United Methodist Church, 864
S.W.2d 286, 288–89 (Ky. 1993)).
159. But see Griffin, supra note 51, at 1012 (expressing concern that “a quick trip to
entanglement takes place when the employer asserts that the contract was not enforced
because the employee was not qualified for the job or performed the job poorly”).
160. Econ. Roofing & Insulating Co. v. Zumaris, 538 N.W.2d 641, 650 (Iowa 1995);
see also McMichael v. Price, 58 P.2d 549, 551–52 (Okla. 1936).
161. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 (1981) (rejecting an additional
requirement of “mutuality of obligation” if consideration is present); Henry Winthrop
Ballantine, Mutuality and Consideration, 28 HARV. L. REV. 121, 131–32 (1914).
162. See Val D. Ricks, In Defense of Mutuality of Obligation: Why “Both Should Be Bound,
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promise may be inappropriate, mutual promises presumptively bind
both parties.163
At least in cases dealing with express contracts164 between a relig-
ious organization and its minister, failure to enforce a promise made by
the religious organization is inimical to the idea of mutuality of obliga-
tion.  A church could indisputably sue its minister on the contract, but
in some instances a minister would be left without a legal remedy.  In
cases where interpretation of the contractual provision at issue is truly
ecclesiastical in nature, courts have good reason to stay their hand.  But
where the contractual provision could be interpreted solely by refer-
ence to neutral principles of law, but a court nonetheless refuses to
adjudicate the claim under the ministerial exception, mutuality of obli-
gation is cast aside.  Analyzing a ministers’ wrongful termination claims
under the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine is thus the proper avenue
for courts to take.  Religious organizations remain free to structure
their affairs and control who ministers to the faithful as they see fit.  But
when a religious organization agrees to terms of a contract and inter-
preting those terms involves no inquiry into church doctrine, courts
must give effect to the contractual obligations.
Some courts prior to Hosanna-Tabor appeared willing to follow this
approach.165  These courts differentiated between contracts that
involved an impermissible religious inquiry (e.g., interpreting the Meth-
odist Book of Discipline166 or asking whether a rabbi engaged in “gross
misconduct”167) and those that involved purely secular determinations
(e.g., an oral promise to transfer an individual to another parish168 or
removal of job responsibilities169).  However, post-Hosanna-Tabor,
courts have evinced a willingness to dismiss all contractual claims of
wrongful termination under the ministerial exception without even
inquiring as to whether the contract could be interpreted under neu-
tral principles of law.170  Courts should jettison this approach and
revert to the inquiry established by the D.C. Circuit in Minker v. Balti-
more Annual Conference of United Methodist Church: Does interpretation of
163. Id. at 525–27 (“Once a court has found assent and mutual promises, to treat
the parties equally and fairly the court should presumably enforce both contracts.”).
164. In the context of contracts implied from informal sources, such as an
employee handbook, the mutuality of obligation concerns are not as pointed.  Because a
minister without an express contract would be free to leave the religious organization as
he pleases, neither party would have a remedy in cases of the minister leaving or being
terminated by his religious employer. See id. at 542 & n.225 (discussing implied contract
claims based on employee handbooks).
165. See supra Section II.A.
166. See Minker v. Balt. Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d
1354, 1358–59 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see also Overstreet, supra note 6, at 293–95 (explaining
why secular courts should dismiss contract claims based on obligations implied from relig-
ious documents).
167. See Friedlander v. Port Jewish Ctr., 347 F. App’x 654, 655 (2d Cir. 2009).
168. See Minker, 894 F.2d at 1359–61.
169. See Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 310 (3d Cir. 2006).
170. See, e.g., Kant v. Lexington Theological Seminary, No. 2011–CA–000004–MR,
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the contractual provision at issue involve an inherently ecclesiastical
matter that civil courts are powerless to resolve, or can it be resolved
simply by resorting to neutral principles of law?
Revisiting the Kant v. Lexington Theological Seminary171 case dis-
cussed in the introduction is illustrative.  Laurence Kant was employed
as a tenured professor at Lexington Theological Seminary (LTS).  The
LTS Faculty Handbook provided that “[t]he only grounds for dismissal
of a tenured faculty member are moral delinquency, unambiguous fail-
ure to perform the responsibilities outlined in this Handbook, or con-
duct detrimental to the Seminary.”172  In 2009, LTS terminated Mr.
Kant because of financial difficulties.  In Kant, the Kentucky Court of
Appeals affirmed dismissal of Mr. Kant’s breach of contract claim under
the ministerial exception and the case is now pending before the
Supreme Court of Kentucky.173
Mr. Kant’s case reveals the fundamental problem with applying the
ministerial exception to categorically bar ministers’ wrongful termina-
tion claims.  LTS fired Mr. Kant for reasons other than those set forth
in the Faculty Handbook; to determine this would require no judicial
entanglement with ecclesiastical matters, merely application of neutral
principles of contract law.174  Though an implied right to terminate a
minister based on financial difficulty may exist as a matter of state con-
tract law, the Kentucky Court of Appeals instead found the ministerial
exception barred the suit.175  This result seems profoundly unjust—
LTS agreed it would only terminate Mr. Kant for reasons A, B, or C,
then terminated him for reason D, but nonetheless cannot be held lia-
ble on its contract, even though interpreting the contract involves no
engagement with ecclesiastical doctrine.  For the reasons set forth in
this Part, the Kentucky Supreme Court, and future courts to address
this matter, should find that the ministerial exception does not bar a
minister’s contract claim against his employer.
CONCLUSION
At the end of Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in Hosanna-Tabor, he
explicitly limited the scope of the holding to the context of employ-
ment discrimination, stating that the ministerial exception’s application
to contract and tort claims was a question for another day.  For many
ministers and religious organizations, that day has come.
Since Hosanna-Tabor, courts have found that the ministerial excep-
tion bars wrongful termination claims by a minister against his
171. Kant, No. 2011–CA–000004–MR (Ky. Ct. App. July 27, 2012).
172. Id. at *5.
173. Id.
174. Had Mr. Kant, for example, engaged in conduct directly contrary to church
teaching, interpreting whether this constituted “conduct detrimental to the seminary”
would likely require an impermissible judicial inquiry.  However, Mr. Kant was terminated
for financial reasons, which fall outside the valid reasons for termination of a tenured
professor under the Faculty Handbook; no inquiry into ecclesiastical matters is necessary
to determine this.
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employer.  These courts have read the broad language of Hosanna-Tabor
to mean that no matter what the context, a church must have the exclu-
sive right to select and terminate its clergy.  However, this approach
neglects many countervailing considerations that distinguish contract
suits from employment discrimination suits.  First, at the time of the
Founding, suits by a minister against his employer for wrongful termi-
nation were not thought to offend the First Amendment.  Second, the
voluntary nature of contracts assuages Free Exercise concerns; a relig-
ious organization’s self-imposed standards are a far cry from the public
law standards imposed upon it by federal employment discrimination
law.  Third, extending the ministerial exception to contract claims
would have universally bad effects on the minister, the minister-church
relationship, and potentially the congregation as a whole.  Finally, the
doctrine of ecclesiastical abstention provides sufficient protection of
religious liberty interests and properly strikes a balance between those
interests and contract law’s emphasis on mutuality of obligation.  Thus,
courts should hold the ministerial exception inapplicable to contract





      05/07/2014   15:37:06
34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 210 Side B      05/07/2014   15:37:06
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\28-1\NDE111.txt unknown Seq: 28  2-MAY-14 7:37
